District Court
09/29/2011
Richard DiPrete v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0173 Procedure
Procedure
Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that the trial magistrate erred in his questioning of the officer. The District Court held that no objection was made during trial and, consequently, the issue was not preserved for review. However, even if the issue had been properly preserved for appeal the Court stated that the trial magistrate acted in accordance with Rule 614 of the Rules of Evidence as his questioning was primarily for clarification purposes. The Court went on to note that even if additional information was extracted from the witness, the trial judge did not make note of it on the record and, therefore, the defendant was not prejudiced. However, the Court reversed the violation on other grounds.
Richard DiPrete v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0173 (September 29, 2011).pdf
District Court
09/29/2011
Richard DiPrete v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0173 Anonymous Tips
Anonymous Tips
Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant asserted that he was stopped in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion. The officer admitted at trial that he did not observe the defendant commit any traffic violations or observe any indicia of intoxication before he stopped the defendant and that the sole basis for the stop was in reliance on “departmental knowledge” allegedly provided by a witness who followed the defendant and informed the dispatcher that the defendant had been in an accident, was possibly intoxicated, and provided the make, model, and license plate. The District Court held that although the officer acted properly in stopping the defendant, the correct analysis under Fourth Amendment precedent for warrantless stops was to inquire whether the “communicating” officer possessed reasonable suspicion to instigate the stop. Here, the Court held that the state did not meet its burden in proving that the dispatcher had reasonable suspicion to instigate the stop because the state failed to prove that the alleged telephone call by the witness was ever made. After suggesting that the state’s failure to meet its burden was enough by itself to recommend reversal, the Court went on to note that following the line of analysis laid out in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), the anonymous tip failed to meet the standards of “veracity, basis of knowledge, and reliability” because the information did not have any predictive value and the police only corroborated the make, model, and license plate of the defendant. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the violation against the defendant.
Richard DiPrete v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0173 (September 29, 2011).pdf
District Court
09/29/2011
Richard DiPrete v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0173 Reasonable Suspcion to Stop
Reasonable Suspicion to Stop
Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). The Court concluded that the decision of the Appeals Panel regarding the Fourth Amendment issue was not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of record, as an arrest made by an officer on the basis of departmental knowledge is validated in one of two ways: “(a) when an arrest has been made pursuant to a warrant, its validity must be examined—including a determination of whether the facts contained in the application constituted probable cause; (b) when a warrantless arrest has been made, it is the knowledge possessed by the officer (or officers, since this principle may operative collectively) who instigated the arrest, the ‘communicating’ officer, that must be evaluated.” Car stops based on departmental knowledge are generally warrantless, thus the second course applies here. The Court held that the arresting officer acted properly, but the prosecution did not meet its burden to show that the stop in the instant case was legally justified because it failed to show that the seizure was validated on the basis of the knowledge of the investigating or communicating officer, in this case the dispatcher. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the Appeals Panel.
Richard DiPrete v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 10-0173 (September 29, 2011).pdf