Appeals Panel
04/17/2014
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)
Due Process
Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law. Specifically, Defendant claimed that various conflicts of interest by the Pawtucket Police Department amounted to a violation of his due process rights that should have resulted in a dismissal of the charges. The Panel looked to various Rhode Island, Connecticut, and U.S. precedent to explain that to succeed on a claim of bias under the Due Process clause, as an initial matter, the defendant must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity by the decision maker. Furthermore, in an administrative proceeding like the Traffic Tribunal, Due Process requires the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner in front of a neutral decision maker. Finally, the defendant must show not only prosecutorial misconduct, but also that the misconduct resulted in unfair prejudice to the defendant. The Panel then looked at the record and found that the defendant made only general accusations of impropriety and failed to identify any specific misconduct committed by the Pawtucket Police Department. Moreover, the defendant did not impute any misconduct to the trial magistrate and did not show that the alleged misconduct resulted in any unfair prejudice. The Panel held that the Defendant did not overcome the presumption that he received a full hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. The Panel explained that it was satisfied that the requirements of due process were met and held that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny the Defendant’s motion to dismiss was not an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf
Appeals Panel
04/17/2014
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)
Constitutional Issues
Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law. Specifically, Defendant claimed that various conflicts of interest by the Pawtucket Police Department amounted to a violation of his due process rights that should have resulted in a dismissal of the charges. The Panel looked to various Rhode Island, Connecticut, and U.S. precedent to explain that to succeed on a claim of bias under the Due Process clause, as an initial matter, the defendant must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity by the decision maker. Furthermore, in an administrative proceeding like the Traffic Tribunal, Due Process requires the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner in front of a neutral decision maker. Finally, the defendant must show not only prosecutorial misconduct, but also that the misconduct resulted in unfair prejudice to the defendant. The Panel then looked at the record and found that the defendant made only general accusations of impropriety and failed to identify any specific misconduct committed by the Pawtucket Police Department. Moreover, the defendant did not impute any misconduct to the trial magistrate and did not show that the alleged misconduct resulted in any unfair prejudice. The Panel held that the Defendant did not overcome the presumption that he received a full hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. The Panel explained that it was satisfied that the requirements of due process were met and held that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny the Defendant’s motion to dismiss was not an error of law or an abuse of discretion
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf
Appeals Panel
04/17/2014
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)
Procedure
Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law. Specifically, Defendant claimed that a District Court order associated with the DUI prosecution of the Defendant required the Pawtucket Police to destroy all police records that tied the defendant to the events underlying the two charges sustained by the Tribunal and that, as a result, the Pawtucket Police could not re-file the charges. The Panel reviewed the plain language of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 12-1-12(a)(1), “Destruction or sealing of records of persons acquitted or otherwise exonerated,” and explained that the statute requires only records of identification be destroyed. The Panel then reviewed the trial record and found no evidence that the Police used any record of identification as a basis to identify Defendant as the operator of the vehicle. Instead, identification was made by in-court testimony of the arresting officer. The Panel explained that defendant’s assertion that the Police could not rely on records of identification ordered destroyed by the District Court order was immaterial to the matter before the Tribunal. Accordingly, the Panel held the trial magistrate’s decision to allow the Police to re-file the charges was not an error of law.
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf
Appeals Panel
04/17/2014
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)
Procedure
Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law. Specifically, Defendant claimed that a District Court order associated with the DUI prosecution of the Defendant required the Pawtucket Police to destroy all police records that tied the defendant to the events underlying the two charges sustained by the Tribunal and that, as a result, the Pawtucket Police could not re-file the charges. The Panel reviewed the plain language of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 12-1-12(a)(1), “Destruction or sealing of records of persons acquitted or otherwise exonerated,” and explained that the statute requires only records of identification be destroyed. The Panel then reviewed the trial record and found no evidence that the Police used any record of identification as a basis to identify Defendant as the operator of the vehicle. Instead, identification was made by in-court testimony of the arresting officer. The Panel explained that defendant’s assertion that the Police could not rely on records of identification ordered destroyed by the District Court order was immaterial to the matter before the Tribunal. Accordingly, the Panel held the trial magistrate’s decision to allow the Police to re-file the charges was not an error of law.
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf
Appeals Panel
04/17/2014
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)
Procedure
Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to allow the City to re-file the charges was made upon unlawful procedure. Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial magistrate was bound by the special prosecutor’s dismissal under Rule 26(a) of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure and therefore should have applied the “law of the case” doctrine to prevent the City from re-filing the charges. The Panel explained that the “law of the case” doctrine stands for the proposition that once a judge has made an interlocutory decision, a second judge confronted with the same issue should not disturb the first ruling. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 683 (R.I. 1999). The Panel explained further that Rule 26(a) allows for termination of the prosecution by the prosecutor, and at no time in the Defendant’s case did any magistrate make any interlocutory decision. The Panel held that the “law of the case” doctrine did not apply to the facts and procedure of the case. Accordingly, the Panel held the trial magistrate did not make an error of law in allowing the City to re-file the charges.
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf
Appeals Panel
04/17/2014
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)
Procedure
Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to allow the City to re-file the charges was made upon unlawful procedure. Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial magistrate was bound by the special prosecutor’s dismissal under Rule 26(a) of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure and therefore should have applied the “law of the case” doctrine to prevent the City from re-filing the charges. The Panel explained that the “law of the case” doctrine stands for the proposition that once a judge has made an interlocutory decision, a second judge confronted with the same issue should not disturb the first ruling. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 683 (R.I. 1999). The Panel explained further that Rule 26(a) allows for termination of the prosecution by the prosecutor, and at no time in the Defendant’s case did any magistrate make any interlocutory decision. The Panel held that the “law of the case” doctrine did not apply to the facts and procedure of the case. Accordingly, the Panel held the trial magistrate did not make an error of law in allowing the City to re-file the charges.
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf
Appeals Panel
04/17/2014
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)
Procedure
Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law. Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial magistrate should have invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent the City from re-filing the charges. The Panel explained that judicial estoppel is invoked at the trial magistrate’s sole discretion in order to prevent a party from changing its position to suit the exigencies of the moment. Moreover, judicial estoppel is necessary only when the opposing party would suffer an unfair advantage as a result. Here, the Panel found that Defendant did not offer evidence that the City gained an unfair advantage by shifting its position, nor did Defendant appeal the conviction on the merits. Accordingly, the Panel held the Defendant did not suffer unfair prejudice and held the trial magistrate’s decision not to invoke judicial estoppel was not an error of law.
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf
Appeals Panel
04/17/2014
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)
Procedure
Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law. Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial magistrate should have invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent the City from re-filing the charges. The Panel explained that judicial estoppel is invoked at the trial magistrate’s sole discretion in order to prevent a party from changing its position to suit the exigencies of the moment. Moreover, judicial estoppel is necessary only when the opposing party would suffer an unfair advantage as a result. Here, the Panel found that Defendant did not offer evidence that the City gained an unfair advantage by shifting its position, nor did Defendant appeal the conviction on the merits. Accordingly, the Panel held the Defendant did not suffer unfair prejudice and held the trial magistrate’s decision not to invoke judicial estoppel was not an error of law.
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf
Appeals Panel
04/17/2014
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)
Procedure
Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law. Specifically, Defendant claimed the trial magistrate should have invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel to prevent the City from re-filing the charges. The Panel explained that judicial estoppel is invoked at the trial magistrate’s sole discretion in order to prevent a party from changing its position to suit the exigencies of the moment. Moreover, judicial estoppel is necessary only when the opposing party would suffer an unfair advantage as a result. Here, the Panel found that Defendant did not offer evidence that the City gained an unfair advantage by shifting its position, nor did Defendant appeal the conviction on the merits. Accordingly, the Panel held the Defendant did not suffer unfair prejudice and held the trial magistrate’s decision not to invoke judicial estoppel was not an error of law.
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf
Appeals Panel
04/17/2014
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)
Dismissal
Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges. The re-filing went to trial and resulted in conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss the charges was an error of law. Specifically, Defendant claimed that the special prosecutor’s dismissal was with prejudice and that the City was required to move to vacate or appeal the initial dismissal before re-filing the charges. The Appeals Panel noted that the preclusive effect of a voluntary dismissal of a civil case in Superior Court is governed by Super R. Civ. P. 41(a), and under that rule a prosecutor’s voluntary dismissal is without prejudice absent an affirmative statement of prejudice or stipulations between the parties. The Appeals Panel applied the reasoning of Super R. Civ. P. 41(a) to Traffic Trib. R. P. 26(a), which allows the prosecuting officer to terminate the charges and held that there is a presumption that a voluntary dismissal is without prejudice. The Panel held that the filing of an appeal, which under the rule can only be filed by an “aggrieved party” was inapposite because the City, which dismissed the charges, was not an aggrieved party. The Panel held that the filing of a Motion to Vacate would be inappropriate because no order had been entered; the role of the Tribunal in a decision by a party to dismiss is administrative only and functions simply to memorialize the dismissal for purposes of record keeping. Accordingly, the Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss was not an error of law.
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf
Appeals Panel
04/17/2014
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014)
Dismissal
Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.” Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest. Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges. The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges. The re-filing went to trial and resulted in conviction on both charges. The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss the charges was an error of law. Specifically, Defendant claimed that the special prosecutor’s dismissal was with prejudice and that the City was required to move to vacate or appeal the initial dismissal before re-filing the charges. The Appeals Panel noted that the preclusive effect of a voluntary dismissal of a civil case in Superior Court is governed by Super R. Civ. P. 41(a), and under that rule a prosecutor’s voluntary dismissal is without prejudice absent an affirmative statement of prejudice or stipulations between the parties. The Appeals Panel applied the reasoning of Super R. Civ. P. 41(a) to Traffic Trib. R. P. 26(a), which allows the prosecuting officer to terminate the charges and held that there is a presumption that a voluntary dismissal is without prejudice. The Panel held that the filing of an appeal, which under the rule can only be filed by an “aggrieved party” was inapposite because the City, which dismissed the charges, was not an aggrieved party. The Panel held that the filing of a Motion to Vacate would be inappropriate because no order had been entered; the role of the Tribunal in a decision by a party to dismiss is administrative only and functions simply to memorialize the dismissal for purposes of record keeping. Accordingly, the Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss was not an error of law.
City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf