Due Process

Defendant was charged with a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop sign). At trial, Defendant presented photographs into evidence, introduced witness testimony, questioned the officer who brought the charge, and offered his own testimony. The Defendant

“mention[ed] that he had videos to present to the Trial Judge a couple times during the trial,” but he “never actually moved to have the videos introduced into evidence.” The Trial Judge found the officer’s testimony credible and that the Defendant failed to stop at the stop sign. The Defendant appealed the decision.

The Defendant raised the argument that his procedural due process rights were violated when he was unable to present all his evidence to the trial court. Procedural due process requires a defendant be provided (1) notice of the hearing and the alleged violation; (2) an opportunity to be heard by an impartial judge; (3) an opportunity to present evidence; (4) and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. State v. Pompey, 934 A.2d 210, 214 (R.I. 2007). The Appeals Panel found the Defendant did not dispute that he did receive notice of the violation, that he was afforded the opportunity to present evidence, that the judge spent time reviewing the evidence presented by appellant, that the defendant was allowed to question the officer and that he offered testimony in his own defense, meeting the requirements of procedural due process. With respect to the video evidence, the Appeals Panel determined that, because the Defendant failed to attempt to authenticate the video or move to introduce the video into evidence at trial, the Trial Judge was not required to consider the admissibility of the video. Therefore, the Appeals Panel determined the Defendant’s claim was unfounded and denied the appeal.State of Rhode Island v. Monteiro No. M21-0009 (February 23, 2022).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to traffic control devices). At trial, a state trooper presented uncontroverted testimony establishing that he had observed Defendant take a left turn through a red arrow. When the trial magistrate asked Defendant if he had any testimony to present, Defendant responded: “[M]y intention today is not to testify.”  On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision violated Defendant’s due process rights because the trial magistrate did not afford Defendant an opportunity to testify at trial.

Procedural due process requires that a defendant be provided an opportunity to present evidence. See State v. Pompey, 934 A.2d 201, 214 (R.I. 2007). Here, the record clearly shows that the trial magistrate offered Defendant an opportunity to present evidence. The trial magistrate explicitly asked Defendant if he had any testimony to present. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision did not violate Defendant’s due process rights. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Xing Guang Cui, No. T19-0004 (June 6, 2019).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed a decision by a trial judge upholding a violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs). Defendant argued that his due process rights were violated because he was not given a “proper opportunity” to testify on his behalf. The Appeals Panel, however, noted that defendant was given multiple opportunities to ask questions of the citing officer and present his own defense. The Appeals Panel further noted that defendant had and took the opportunity to give his own version of the events in question. After making these findings, the Appeals Panel held that defendant had not been denied due process. Accordingly the Appeals Panel denied defendant’s appeal and upheld the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation.

Town of Coventry v. Michael Baird, No. M17-0007 (April 24, 2018).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appeals the decision of the trial court denying defendant’s Motion for an Ability to Pay Hearing filed pursuant to Rule 5(b) of the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure. Defendant argued that the suspension of his license based upon his non-payment of fines that he was not able to pay violated his right to equal protection and due process. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the discretionary relief provided under Rule 20, which allows a motorist to seek relief from a judgment or order “in the interest of justice,” created an adequate avenue for recourse. The Appeals Panel agreed with the trial court that the newly amended Rule 5(b) did not retroactively apply to a defendant whose license was suspended prior to the RI Supreme Court amending the rule. The Appeals Panel held that the trial court’s decision did not violate due process and equal protection because Rule 20 provided the defendant a different avenue to request relief from a license suspension because of an inability to pay. The Appeals Panel did not find that the difference between relief as a matter of right and relief as a matter of discretion rose to the level of constitutional significance. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was affirmed. 

State of Rhode Island v. Reynaldo Rodriguez, No. T16-0027 (July 11, 2017).pdf

Due Process

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways). The Defendant argued that he did not have a fair opportunity to present his case because the trial magistrate appeared late to court. The Panel held that the trial transcript illustrates both that the Defendant had an opportunity to present his argument and that the trial magistrate considered the Defendant’s testimony before making a decision. Accordingly, the Panel held that the Defendant had a fair opportunity to make his case and upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Alla Hassan, C.A. No. T14-0053 (April 20, 2015).pdf

Due Process

The Defendant appealed a default judgment entered by the trial magistrate, sustaining the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-10-1 (no license on person), § 31-22-22(g) (no seat belt-operator), § 31-21-4 (places where parking or stopping prohibited), § 31-15-12.1 (entering intersection), and § 31-47-9 (operating a motor vehicle without evidence of insurance). The Defendant argued that his due process rights were violated because he was not allowed the fundamental right to a fair trial. The Panel held that though the Defendant failed to appear at his arraignment, because he presented evidence in his defense as two of the violations – § 31-10-1 (no license on person) and § 31-47-9 (operating a vehicle without evidence of insurance) – in the interest of justice, those two violations must be dismissed. Accordingly, after reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the Panel denied the Defendant’s appeal in part and granted it in part.

City of Cranston v. In Re- Richard W. Audette, C.A. No. T14-0036 (March 30, 2015).pdf

Due Process

The Defendant appealed the validity of his plea to the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that the trial judge coerced him into entering a guilty plea because he informed the Defendant that his license would be suspended if he proceeded to trial. The Panel pointed out that the Defendant was informed only of the possibility of suspension after trial before the Defendant entered a guilty plea. The Panel held that the Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pled guilty after the trial judge provided him with sufficient and accurate information. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

City of Providence v. Blake Barrie, C.A. No. M14-0010 (June 30, 2015).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22 (safety belt use). Defendant argued that his due process rights were violated because he was not afforded the opportunity to a speedy trial. The Appeals Panel held that the right to a speedy trial only applies to criminal prosecutions and, because the charge of violating § 31-22-22 is civil in nature, the constitutional right to a speedy trial had no application. “Due Process” at the Traffic Tribunal means “an opportunity to be heard within a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Here, the defendant’s rights were not violated because he had been fully heard on the merits of the case and had cross-examined the officer. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.City of East Providence v. James Folan, C.A. No. M13-0016 (January 28, 2014).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11, “laned roadway violations” and § 31-27-2.1, “refusal to submit to a chemical test.”  Initially, the City of Pawtucket appointed a special prosecutor due to a potential conflict of interest.  Subsequently, the special prosecutor dismissed the charges.  The Pawtucket Police then re-filed the charges, and the resulting trial ended in a conviction on both charges.  The Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny his motion to dismiss was an error of law.  Specifically, Defendant claimed that various conflicts of interest by the Pawtucket Police Department amounted to a violation of his due process rights that should have resulted in a dismissal of the charges.  The Panel looked to various Rhode Island, Connecticut, and U.S. precedent to explain that to succeed on a claim of bias under the Due Process clause, as an initial matter, the defendant must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity by the decision maker.  Furthermore, in an administrative proceeding like the Traffic Tribunal, Due Process requires the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner in front of a neutral decision maker.  Finally, the defendant must show not only prosecutorial misconduct, but also that the misconduct resulted in unfair prejudice to the defendant.  The Panel then looked at the record and found that the defendant made only general accusations of impropriety and failed to identify any specific misconduct committed by the Pawtucket Police Department.  Moreover, the defendant did not impute any misconduct to the trial magistrate and did not show that the alleged misconduct resulted in any unfair prejudice.  The Panel held that the Defendant did not overcome the presumption that he received a full hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal.  The Panel explained that it was satisfied that the requirements of due process were met and held that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny the Defendant’s motion to dismiss was not an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

City of Pawtucket v. Jarred Lynch, C.A. No. T12-0032 (April 17, 2014).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 “Obedience to traffic control devices.”  The issuing Officers charged Defendant after observing him operate his vehicle through a red light from a fixed position with an unobstructed view.  Defendant argued that the trial judge violated his Due Process rights when the judge allegedly made an in-court but off-the-record comment that the Defendant would be in more trouble if he continued down the road he was going. The Panel noted that if the alleged comment was made, it was made in open court in the presence of all interested parties.  The Panel held that the words allegedly spoken by the judge were unrelated to the case and the charge and were, therefore, immaterial.  The Panel held that the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charge was based on legally competent evidence – the testimony of the officer – and that the Defendant did not present any defenses to the facts underlying the charge.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Town of North Providence vs. Mark Medeiros, C.A. No. M13-0005 (November 4, 2013).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima Facie Limits).  Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision was in violation of Constitutional provisions because his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily due to his unfamiliarity with the English language.  The Panel explained that a court must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a guilty plea is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  Here, the Panel noted that the trial magistrate twice asked the Defendant if he understood English and twice he answered “Yes.”  Additionally, the Panel explained that the Defendant had numerous speeding tickets on his record and thus had some experience with the traffic tribunal.  Based on the Defendant’s testimony that he understood English and his frequency with the tribunal, the Panel held that his guilty plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Xiangmin Ou, C.A. No. T12-0084 (June 6, 2013).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed from the decision of the hearing magistrate accepting his guilty plea to the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22 (safety belt use—child restraint) and imposing a sentence that included a six month license suspension.  Defendant argued that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  The Panel explained that the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure and the Rhode Island Supreme Court demand that all guilty pleas be made knowingly and voluntarily, and that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating, with evidence, that a guilty plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily.  The Panel noted that the Defendant here was advised of the violation against him before entering his plea, and he chose to plead guilty.  Further, the Panel noted the Defendant did not produce any evidence to show that his plea was anything but voluntary.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation. 

State of Rhode Island v. Zigmond Coffey, C.A. No. T12-0014 (May 4, 2012).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22 (safety belt use).  Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision was in violation of Defendant’s Constitutional rights because the magistrate denied his motion for a jury trial.  Specifically, Defendant argued that the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees a jury trial for civil actions when the amount in controversy exceeds twenty dollars.  The Panel explained the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases has not been applied to the States by the Supreme Court of the United States.  The Panel further explained that no Rhode Island Supreme Court precedent demands a jury trial in civil cases other than those cases that were based on actions triable by a jury at the time of the adoption of our State Constitution in 1842.  The Panel explained that in 1842, the motor vehicle code was not in effect.  Additionally, the Panel explained that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has considered whether a motor vehicle code violation should warrant a jury trial and held it does not.  See Calore Freight Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Trans., 576 A.2d 1214 (1990).  The Calore Court further suggested that if an offense is of a type that should warrant a jury trial, or is similar to an offense in existence in 1842, a jury trial may be appropriate.  Id.  However, the Panel explained that no similar offense existed in 1842, and that because the fines imposed in a motor vehicle code violation are definite and not subject to discretion, there is limited need for a jury.  The Panel held that there is no right to a jury trial for a motor vehicle code violation.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation. 

State of Rhode Island v. John Miner, C.A. No. T12-0024 (August 20, 2012).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The officer who pulled the defendant over for speeding testified for the state, which concluded the state’s case in chief. After a short cross-examination, the Appellant’s counsel stated that he had “no other questions, Judge.” Then, the trial magistrate stated that the prosecution had met its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence and sustained the violation against the defendant.  The trial magistrate had understood “no other questions Judge” to refer to the case in chief, but the Appellant’s counsel was only stating that he had no further questions for the officer. The Appellant was not afforded an opportunity to present his case in chief. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel  determined that remanding the case  was appropriate because the trial magistrate’s error was the result of his misunderstanding the defendant’s counsel.

State of Rhode Island v. Delory- T12-0036.pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violatin of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The Appeals Panel held that the defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did not intelligently and understandingly waive her rights when entering into a guilty plea.  The Court also reasoned that, in the civil context, the denial of a motion to vacate or modify a judgment is within the discretion of the trial justice and will only be reversed on a showing of abuse of discretion or other error of law.  Thus, the Court held that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion as he was only under the duty to inform the defendant of the statutory fine and took the extra step to warn the defendant of a license suspension.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation. 

State of Rhode Island v. Milissa Garrity, C.A. No. T12-0051 (September 4, 2012).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed the decsion of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The Appeals Panel held that because the defendant never asked the hearing magistrate any questions and because the hearing magistrate asked the defendant if she understood the consequences of her plea and she stated she did, the hearing magistrate complied with the rules of procedure.  The Court also noted that even though pro se litigants should be afforded “some latitude,” it would have been impermissible of the hearing magistrate to deviate from the rules of procedure simply because of the defendant’s pro se status.  Accordingly, the Court sustanined the violation against the defendant. 

State of Rhode Island v. Milissa Garrity, C.A. No. T12-0051 (September 4, 2012).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-12 (stopping for school bus required). Defendant claimed that the trial judge abused her discretion when she determined that the defendant’s son was not competent to testify because she observed that the child was “too nervous” and stated she was “not going to put [the defendant’s son] through that.” The Court held that generally, witnesses are presumed to be competent to testify until proven otherwise, however, children present unique circumstances and should be evaluated to determine the competency and trustworthiness of their testimony. The Rhode Island Supreme Court in State v. Girourard, 561 A.2d 882, 886 (R.I. 1989), set out four capacities that the trial judge must be satisfied that the child possesses in order for a child to be competent to testify: the ability to observe, to recollect, to communicate, and to appreciate the necessity of telling the truth. Here, the Court held that the trial judge’s decision that the defendant’s son was not competent was an abuse of discretion because she did not conduct the analysis prescribed in Girourard to determine if the child was competent to testify. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the trial judge and dismissed the violation.City of Providence v. Gerald Fogel, C.A. No. T11-0055 (November 21, 2011).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-1 (right half of road). The Court held that, according to Dana v. Petit, 386 A.2d 189 (R. I. 1978), the right to drive and not the driver’s license is protected under the Due Process clause. Since the defendant was allowed to present his case in front of the trial judge and again in front of the Appeals Panel, the requirements of Due Process were satisfied.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

Town of South Kingstown v. Jon Lachapelle, C.A. No. T10-0045 (July 14, 2010).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed the decision of the North Providence Municipal Court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-09 (obedience to stop signs). The Court held that the fact that the citing officer mistakenly wrote on the citation that the defendant was the owner of the vehicle did not rise to the level of a procedural due process violation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision sustaining the violation against the defendant.Town of North Providence v. Paul DiNobile, C.A. No. M09-0002 (May 18,2009).pdf

Due Process

Defendant appealed the decision of the Johnston Municipal Court sustaining the charge of violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-3 (passing of vehicles proceeding in opposite direction). Following Davis v. Wood, 427 A.2d 332, 337 (R.I. 1981), the Court held that “a combination of prosecutorial and judicial functions in the same individual is condemned.” Since the prosecutor recused herself and the trial judge took over prosecuting the case, the judge was no longer an impartial fact finder. Thus, the Court remanded the matter to the Johnston Municipal Court for a new trial.

City of Johnston v. John O’Brien, C.A. No. M08-0022 (September 17, 2009).pdf

Due Process

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-16-5 (turn signal required) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22 (safety belt use). The Defendant, who appeared pro se, argued that the trial judge violated his due process rights by not advising him of his right to cross-examine the Officer. The Panel noted that a pro se litigant is expected to become familiar with the rules of procedure and that, had the Defendant reviewed the rules of procedure, he would have realized that he was entitled to cross-examine the Officer. Nonetheless, the Panel held that the Defendant was deprived by not being afforded a meaningful opportunity to cross–examine the Officer as to the seat-belt violation. Accordingly, the Panel remanded the seat-belt violation to allow the Defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the Officer.

City of Providence v. Emilio Taylor, C.A. T08-0097 (November 5, 2008).pdf

Due Process

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-16-5 (turn signal required) and R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22 (safety belt use). The Defendant argued that he was denied the right to a fair trial because the trial judge acted as both the prosecutor and fact-finder. Here, the Panel held that where the trial judge interrupted the Officer’s testimony to question about facts in evidence, he did so for purposes of clarification.  Accordingly, the Panel held that the Defendant’s due process rights were not compromised and upheld the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violations.

City of Providence v. Emilio Taylor, C.A. T08-0097 (November 5, 2008).pdf

Due Process

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-5 (overtaking on the right). The Defendant argued that his due process rights were compromised because the Officer testified to a different location from the location in the summons. The Panel held that the fact that the Defendant did not have notice of the precise location of the violation did not compromise his due process rights because the exact location was not an essential element of the charged violation. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Aaron Desjarlais, C.A. T08-0107 (September 24, 2008).pdf