School Bus Violations

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-51-2.2 (“stopping for school bus required”). Defendant argued that he had a defense to the violation via § 31-20-10.3, which prohibits school buses from “discharging or picking up passengers at any intersection where a traffic control device controls the movement of the bus.”  In Commercial Union Ins. Co. v Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 681 (R.I. 1999), the RI Supreme Court held that this court cannot construe a statute in a way that would result in absurdities or defeat the underlying purpose. In State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1081 (R.I. 1981), the RI Supreme Court held that statutes relating to same subject should be construed to harmonize with each other. The Appeals Panel found that § 31-20-10.3 and § 31-51-2.2 were created by the legislature to protect school children and not motorists. If § 31-20-10.3 were construed to provide a defense to 31-51-2.2, then motorists would be allowed to disregard a school bus’s stop signs and thus endanger children. This would be an absurd result. Therefore, the Appeals Panel held that § 31-20-10.3 does not create a defense to § 31-51.2.2. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial court’s decision sustaining the violation.

City of Providence v. Chelo J. Espaillat, No. 14-0035 (June 9, 2016).pdf