School Bus Violations

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-51-2.2 (stopping for school bus required—digital video). At trial, a video recording showed Defendant’s vehicle passing a stopped school bus whose red lights were activated. Also, Defendant admitted to passing the stopped school bus. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge erred because there was insufficient evidence to sustain the charged violation.

Under § 31-41-2.2, a person is guilty when the evidence presented at trial shows that a school bus’s flashing red lights were activated and the driver failed to stop before reaching the school bus. Here, the video presented at trial clearly demonstrated that the school bus’s flashing red lights were activated. Moreover, Defendant admitted to passing the school bus. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was supported by sufficient evidence. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. George Delany, No. T19-0008 (July 17, 2019).pdf

School Bus Violations

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-51-2.2 (stopping for school bus required—digital video). At trial, a video recording showed Defendant’s vehicle passing a stopped school bus whose red lights were activated. Also, Defendant admitted to passing the stopped school bus.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge erred because Defendant did not have enough time to stop for the school bus. But whether a driver has a reasonable amount of time to stop for a school bus is not an element of the statute. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. George Delany, No. T19-0008 (July 17, 2019).pdf

School Bus Violations

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-51-2.2 (stopping for school bus required—digital video). A video recording captured Defendant’s vehicle passing a stopped school bus. Defendant argued that the trial judge erred because there was insufficient evidence to support the elements of the charge. To find a motorist guilty, a trial judge must find that (1) the school bus’s red flashing lights were activated, and (2) that the driver did not stop before reaching the bus. Although the record indicated that the bus’s stop sign was out and that Defendant did not stop her car before reaching the bus, there was “no indication that the bus’s flashing red lights were activated before” Defendant’s car reached the bus. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge erred because there was insufficient evidence offered at trial to support the trial judge’s decision. Accordingly, the charged violation was dismissed.

State of Rhode Island v. Rhonda Alexander, No. T18-0011 (January 18, 2018).pdf

School Bus Violations

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-51-2.2 (stopping for school bus required—digital video). A video recording captured Defendant’s vehicle passing a school bus, and a police officer subsequently issued a summons to Defendant. § 31-51-3(d) requires that two separate documents be attached to the summons: (1) a signed statement by the officer viewing the video recording; and (2) a signed affidavit by someone who “witnessed the motor vehicle being operated in violation of” the statute. Although the statute does not make clear whether a single officer is “permitted to serve as both” the signing officer under § 31-51-3(d)(2) and the signing witness under § 31-51-3(d)(5), the statute clearly requires that two separate documents be attached to the summons.

At trial, the officer who issued the summons admitted to attaching only one affidavit to the summons because he thought that he could “act as both” the signing officer and the signing witness. The trial judge determined that the officer’s “viewing of the video was enough” to satisfy the notice requirements set forth in § 31-51-3. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge erred because the notice requirements set forth in § 31-51-3 were not met. The Appeals Panel held that the trial judge erred because the notice requirements were not satisfied since the officer only attached one document to the summons. As a result, the Appeals Panel did not reach the issue of whether an officer can serve as both the signing officer and the signing witness. Accordingly, the charged violation was dismissed.

State of Rhode Island v. Milan Mare, No. T18-0019 (no date).pdf

School Bus Violations

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-51-2.2 (“stopping for school bus required”). Defendant argued that he had a defense to the violation via § 31-20-10.3, which prohibits school buses from “discharging or picking up passengers at any intersection where a traffic control device controls the movement of the bus.”  In Commercial Union Ins. Co. v Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 681 (R.I. 1999), the RI Supreme Court held that this court cannot construe a statute in a way that would result in absurdities or defeat the underlying purpose. In State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1081 (R.I. 1981), the RI Supreme Court held that statutes relating to same subject should be construed to harmonize with each other. The Appeals Panel found that § 31-20-10.3 and § 31-51-2.2 were created by the legislature to protect school children and not motorists. If § 31-20-10.3 were construed to provide a defense to 31-51-2.2, then motorists would be allowed to disregard a school bus’s stop signs and thus endanger children. This would be an absurd result. Therefore, the Appeals Panel held that § 31-20-10.3 does not create a defense to § 31-51.2.2. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial court’s decision sustaining the violation.

City of Providence v. Chelo J. Espaillat, No. 14-0035 (June 9, 2016).pdf

School Bus Violations

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-51-2.2 (stopping for school bus required). Defendant claimed the decision of the trial judge was clearly erroneous because the evidence produced at trial did not show that the defendant failed to stop before reaching the school bus. Section 31-51-2.2 requires that a vehicle stop “before reaching a bus” when flashing red lights are engaged. Here, although the record supported the decision of the trial judge that the defendant failed to stop at the stop sign attached to the bus, the record did not support the conclusion that the defendant failed to stop before her car reached the bus, or that the red lights were in operation at the time the defendant began to pass the bus. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel held that the decision of the trial judge was clearly erroneous and dismissed the violation.City of Providence v. Bianca MaDonna, C.A. No. T13-0009 (August 26, 2013).pdf

School Bus Violations

Defendant appealed the decision of the hearing judge denying a motion for relief from judgment for the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-20-12 (stopping for school bus required). Section 31-20-12 requires that a motorist stop for a school bus transporting children while flashing lights are engaged, but § 31-20-13 allows the motorist to pass when the motorist and bus are traveling in opposite lanes and separated by a median.  Defendant argued that he suffered prejudice because the two statutes are in conflict with each other.  The Panel held that the two statutes anticipate each other and operate to give effect to the Legislature’s intent to reduce highway fatalities through increased caution when operating motor vehicles in the vicinity of school buses.  The Panel held that the Defendant suffered no prejudice and sustained the charged violation.

City of Providence v. Arthur Toegemann, C.A. No. T09-0114 (December 9, 2009).pdf