Burden of Proof

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22(a) (Safety belt use – child restraint). The Trooper testified that, after stopping the car for a tinted window violation, he observed two children in the back seat without child restraints.  He asked Defendant, who was the driver, whether the two unrestrained children were under seven years old, which is an element of the offense charged, and the Defendant answered in the affirmative.  At the conclusion of the Trooper’s testimony the trial judge informed the Defendant that “[t]he burden goes to [him] to prove that [the children] were, in fact, over seven.” The Defendant testified that he did not recall telling the Trooper the children were under seven and that he did not know the ages of the two children.  The Panel held that the trial judge properly chose to credit the Trooper’s testimony and Defendant’s admission on the scene.  The Panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the trial judge had improperly shifted the burden of proof, holding that Defendant’s admission was sufficient to constitute a prima facie case, thereby permitting a shifting of the burden of going forward to Defendant.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the violation.

Magistrate Noonan filed a vigorous dissent, arguing that by instructing the Defendant he had the burden to refute the Trooper’s testimony, the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof away from the State and onto the Defendant to prove the children were not under seven years old.  Under that reasoning, the dissent would have dismissed the violation as an error of law.

City of Providence v. Ramon Perez, C.A. No. T10-0017 (June 23, 2010).pdf