Burden of Proof

Defendant appealed a decision from a Trial Judge of the Coventry Municipal Court sustaining a violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 31-15-16 (“use of emergency breakdown lane for travel”). Defendant was involved in an accident on Arnold Road, where there was a single lane of travel and a breakdown lane. When the citing officer arrived at the scene, Defendant’s vehicle was positioned in the breakdown lane after colliding with a vehicle that was turning into a gas station. Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to prove that she was operating her vehicle in the breakdown lane at the time of the accident. The Appeals Panel noted that the Trial Judge properly inferred that Defendant had been operating in the breakdown lane based on the positioning of the vehicles at the time the citing officer arrived at the scene and on Defendant’s admission that she had been driving. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel found that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the charged violation. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel denied Defendant’s appeal and sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Nathalie Fiske, No. M17-0002 (April 16, 2018).pdf

Burden of Proof

Defendant appealed from a decision by the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-4 “vehicle entering stop or yield intersection.”  The Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because the judge applied the wrong burden of proof in reaching his decision.  Specifically, the trial judge cited the standard he used as “the preponderance of what’s in front of me…”  The Panel explained that the proper standard of proof under Rule 17 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure is a standard of “clear and convincing evidence.”  The Panel held that the trial judge applied the incorrect standard of proof and that the testimony could not sustain by “clear and convincing” evidence that the Defendant operated her vehicle in violation of the statute charged.  The Panel further noted that the judge did not make any specific findings of fact in his decision.  Accordingly, the Panel held the trial judge’s decision constituted an error of law requiring reversal and dismissed the charged violation.

Town of Bristol v. Rebecca Ramos, C.A. No. M12-0019 (August 8, 2013).pdf

Burden of Proof

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22(a) (Safety belt use – child restraint). The Trooper testified that, after stopping the car for a tinted window violation, he observed two children in the back seat without child restraints.  He asked Defendant, who was the driver, whether the two unrestrained children were under seven years old, which is an element of the offense charged, and the Defendant answered in the affirmative.  At the conclusion of the Trooper’s testimony the trial judge informed the Defendant that “[t]he burden goes to [him] to prove that [the children] were, in fact, over seven.” The Defendant testified that he did not recall telling the Trooper the children were under seven and that he did not know the ages of the two children.  The Panel held that the trial judge properly chose to credit the Trooper’s testimony and Defendant’s admission on the scene.  The Panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the trial judge had improperly shifted the burden of proof, holding that Defendant’s admission was sufficient to constitute a prima facie case, thereby permitting a shifting of the burden of going forward to Defendant.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the violation.

Magistrate Noonan filed a vigorous dissent, arguing that by instructing the Defendant he had the burden to refute the Trooper’s testimony, the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof away from the State and onto the Defendant to prove the children were not under seven years old.  Under that reasoning, the dissent would have dismissed the violation as an error of law.

City of Providence v. Ramon Perez, C.A. No. T10-0017 (June 23, 2010).pdf

Burden of Proof

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-47-9 (proof of financial security). Here, the Officer asked for the Defendant’s insurance information following an accident and the Defendant responded that he had insurance that he would present proof of at trial. The Defendant argued that the trial judge erred in sustaining the charge when the Defendant failed to bring the proof to trial. At the trial, the judge declared that the Defendant’s failure to provide proof of insurance established a prima facie case sufficient to sustain the charge. The Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was improper because, despite the Rule 17 requirement that the burden be on the prosecution by clear and convincing evidence, the trial judge found shifted the burden of proof to the Defendant and sustained the charge when the Defendant failed to meet it. Accordingly, the Panel reversed the trial judge’s decision and dismissed the charged violation.

City of Providence v. Emiliano Giron, C.A. T08-0125 (October 22, 2008).pdf

Burden of Proof

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 24-10-20 (park and ride lots). The Panel noted that pursuant to Rule 17, the prosecution was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant did not utilize the park and ride lot for its intended purpose of facilitating access to and from public transportation. At the trial, the trial judge found that the officer’s testimony established a prima facie case and that it was up to the Defendant to present mitigating facts. The Panel held that the trial judge improperly shifted the burden to the Defendant. Accordingly, the Panel reversed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Ralph Marden, C.A. T08-0120 (October 29, 2008).pdf