RI District Court and Traffic Tribunal Case Law

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Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island (RITT Appeals Panel), A.A. No. 13 -139 (April 29, 2014)

Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island (RITT Appeals Panel), A.A. No. 13 -139 (April 29, 2014).pdf
District Court
04/29/2014
Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13 -139 Reasonable Grounds

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant claimed the magistrate erred in applying the wrong fact-finding standard because he applied a subjective standard when he considered “what was in [the officer’s] mind at the time of the stop.” The Court held that the magistrate did not err and applied the proper objective test because the Court must incorporate the personal knowledge and experience of the police officer when determining the existence of reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island (RITT Appeals Panel), A.A. No. 13 -139 (April 29, 2014).pdf

District Court
04/29/2014
Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13 -139 Burden of Proof

Burden of Proof

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant claimed the trial magistrate applied the wrong evidentiary standard of proof because he stated “clear and convincing evidence is not a hard standard to meet.” The Court held that the magistrate’s statement was an expression of opinion and that the clear and convincing standard “would undoubtedly be viewed as ‘not hard’ in comparison to the criminal standard [of] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Accordingly, the Court concluded that the magistrate did not misapply the applicable standard of clear and convincing. Thus, the violation was sustained.Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island (RITT Appeals Panel), A.A. No. 13 -139 (April 29, 2014).pdf

District Court
04/29/2014
Collen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13 -139 Knowing and Voluntary Decision

Knowing and Voluntary Decision

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). Defendant claimed that the decision of the Appeals Panel should be reversed because she was unable to knowingly and voluntarily refuse to submit to a chemical test. However, the Court concluded that the defendant only raised this argument in passing and failed to allege either that § 31-27-2.1 requires a refusal to be made knowingly and voluntarily, or that a provision of constitutional law was violated. Accordingly, the Court declined to judge the validity of the defendant’s argument and sustained the violation. Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island (RITT Appeals Panel), A.A. No. 13 -139 (April 29, 2014).pdf

District Court
04/29/2014
Collen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 13 -139 Reasonable Grounds

Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause

Defendant appealed the decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit). The District Court held that the decision of the Appeals Panel finding that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was operating a vehicle under the influence was not clearly erroneous because the state presented five indicia that the defendant had operated under the influence, including: the defendant admitted to alcohol consumption, had watery and bloodshot eyes, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, was unsteady exiting the vehicle, and nearly hit a parked vehicle while attempting to pull over. Defendant had presented testimony by an expert witness stating that what appeared to be indicia of alcohol consumption were in fact manifestations of the defendant’s mental state. The District Court concluded that the expert testimony was immaterial to the charge of refusal to submit because a defendant may be penalized for refusing under § 31-27-2.1 as long as the officer observes sufficient indicia of intoxication to constitute reasonable grounds, even if it is later revealed that the indicia of intoxication were the result of some source other than alcohol or drug intoxication. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the decision of the Appeals Panel was not clearly erroneous but was supported by substantial evidence. Colleen Lawrence v. State of Rhode Island (RITT Appeals Panel), A.A. No. 13 -139 (April 29, 2014).pdf