Operation of Motor Vehicle

Defendant appealed a decision of the Appeals Panel sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Police responded to a call from a D’Angelo’s sandwich shop employee that indicated that Defendant may have been driving under the influence. Based on the vehicle registration number, a police officer located the vehicle in a parking lot at a different location. Defendant was found in the driver’s seat with the engine running. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer noticed a D’Angelo’s sandwich in the vehicle, and Defendant admitted that he “had just come from D’Angelo’s.” Before the Appeals Panel Defendant argued that “the State never proved [Defendant] had ‘operated’ his vehicle within the meaning of [the refusal statute].” Before the District Court, however, Defendant seemed to have abandoned that argument, arguing instead that “the State did not prove that [the arresting officer] had reasonable suspicion to believe he had operated a motor vehicle.” Defendant cited State v. Capuano, 591 A.2d 35 (R.I. 1991), for the proposition that “sitting at the controls of a vehicle does not constitute operating a motor vehicle.” The District Court, in dicta, despite noting that the basis for such a prosecution is the implied consent that is predicated on operating a motor vehicle, suggested that the State need not prove operation in a refusal prosecution; instead, the State must prove only that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Defendant had been operating. On that issue, the Court found that his admission that he had driven, alone or combined with other facts, was sufficient to establish reasonable ground. The court explicitly declined to reach the argument that sitting behind the wheel with the engine running might constitute “operation.”  Accordingly, the District Court affirmed the decision of the Appeals Panel.

David DiOrio v. State of Rhode Island, A.A. No. 19-20 (December 19, 2019).pdf