Appeals Panel
06/09/2010
State of Rhode Island v. James Estey, Jr., C.A. No. T10-0029 (June 9, 2010) Discovery
Discovery
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 §§ 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and 31-14-3 (conditions requiring reduced speed). Defendant argued that his due process rights were violated when the State failed to deliver in discovery copies of the Officer’s initial recorded statements or initial written narrative because the statements had a material bearing on his guilt or innocence. The Panel explained that, in order to demonstrate a due process violation based on the destruction of exculpatory evidence under the “tripartite” test adopted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in State v. Garcia, 643 A.2d 180, 185 (R.I. 1994), a defendant must show: (1) the evidence possessed exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed; (2) the Defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable means; and (3) the failure to preserve the exculpatory evidence amounted to bad faith on the part of the state. Id. The Panel explained that the Defendant failed to satisfy all three prongs of the test because: 1) there had been no showing that the evidence would exonerate or cast any doubt on the credibility of Officer’s trial testimony; 2) the final written report differed only in grammatical changes and revisions indicating the type of medication the defendant was regularly taking at the time of arrest; and 3) there was no showing of bad faith because the police regularly destroy initial field notes before submitting their final reports. Accordingly, the Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision did not prejudice the due process rights of the Defendant and sustained the charged violations.
State of Rhode Island v. James Estey, Jr., C.A. No. T10-0029 (June 9, 2010).pdf
District Court
06/09/2010
State of Rhode Island v. James Estey, Jr., C.A. No. T10-0029 (June 9, 2010) Reasonable Grounds
Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 §§ 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and 31-14-3 (conditions requiring reduced speed). Defendant argued that the Officer did not have reasonable grounds to warrant a second chemical test to determine the presence of drugs or a controlled substance. The Panel noted that the Officer observed the Defendant operating his vehicle erratically at twice the posted speed limit during inclement weather. After stopping the Defendant the Officer observed that he smelled of alcohol, had “glassy” eyes, was driving in the opposite direction of his intended location, failed two field sobriety tests, and was in possession of two bottles of pills. The Panel held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the Officer had reasonable grounds to suspect the Defendant was impaired by alcohol or drugs, and after a breathalyzer test ruled out alcohol as the cause of the Defendant’s impairment, the Officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the cause of the Defendant’s impairment was prescription or illicit drugs. Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.
State of Rhode Island v. James Estey, Jr., C.A. No. T10-0029 (June 9, 2010).pdf
Appeals Panel
06/09/2010
State of Rhode Island v. James Estey, Jr., C.A. No. T10-0029 (June 9, 2010) Due Process
Constitutional Issues
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 §§ 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test) and 31-14-3 (conditions requiring reduced speed). After submitting to two breath tests, Defendant was asked to submit to a blood test, which he refused. Defendant argued that he denied his due process rights when the police asked him to submit to a second chemical test because the “Rights for the Use at Station” form’s language – “I request you submit to a chemical test” – fails to inform a suspected impaired driver that he or she must submit to more than one chemical test. The Defendant argued that, in order to satisfy due process, the language should be changed to track § 31-27-2.1, which allows for the administration of two chemical tests. The Panel explained that the use of the singular article “a” is used because the form is read before a single chemical test for either alcohol or drugs is administered. The Panel noted that there is no statutory or constitutional requirement that suspected impaired drivers be told they may be subjected to multiple tests. The Panel noted that the Officer read the Defendant the Rights for Use at the Station form before both tests and that the Defendant was fully apprised of the consequences of refusing to submit to the second test and willingly refused. The Panel held that none of the Defendant’s due process rights were violated and accordingly sustained the charged violations.
State of Rhode Island v. James Estey, Jr., C.A. No. T10-0029 (June 9, 2010).pdf