Appeals Panel
09/22/2010
State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent C.A. No. T10-0056 Probable Cause
Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that, the officer was speaking in general terms and was not referring particularly to the defendant when he mentioned that sometimes he had doubts at the scene about whether the defendant was indeed under the influence of a controlled substance. The fact that he requested a preliminary breath test was “no[t] a factual support for Appellant’s contention that her medical condition gave [the officer] second doubts as to her level of intoxication.” Therefore, the charged violation was sustained.
State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent.pdf
Appeals Panel
09/22/2010
State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent C.A. No. T10-0056 Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause
Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). The Court held that, despite the defendant’s argument that the officer’s reasonable suspicion was faulty as her medical condition rendered her unable to perform field sobriety tests, “reasonable suspicion can be based on the officer’s observation of the motorist’s vehicle while in operation; such as swerving from lane to lane or other ‘erratic movements of [the vehicle.]’” State v. Jenkins, 673 A.2d 1094, 1097 (R.I. 1996); State v. Bruno, 709 A.2d 1048, 1050 (R.I. 1998). Since the field “sobriety tests were just one factor used by [the officer] to make his determination that [the defendant] was intoxicated,” the violation was sustained.
State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent.pdf
Appeals Panel
09/22/2010
State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent C.A. No. T10-0056 Reasonable Grounds
Reasonable Grounds/Probable Cause
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe that she had operated a vehicle under the influence because she informed the officer that her medical condition affected her performance on the field sobriety tests. The Court held that reasonable grounds existed for the officer to believe that the defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence because the defendant exhibited numerous indicia of intoxication in addition to her performance on the field sobriety tests, including that she had bloodshot and watery eyes, she had an unsteady gate when exiting the vehicle, she drove erratically and nearly collided with the officer’s vehicle, and she emitted an odor of alcohol. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent.pdf
Appeals Panel
09/22/2010
State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent T10-0056 Procedure
Procedure
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant claimed that the trial judge took improper judicial notice on the issue of whether the defendant was afforded a confidential phone call because the judge relied on his own personal experiences instead of making credibility determinations based on the evidence presented at trial. The Court held that the trial judge relied on the officer’s testimony that he could not hear any of the defendant’s conversation to determine whether the defendant was afforded a confidential phone call and did not take improper judicial notice when he stated that he was familiar with the NCO room at the police barracks because he did not supply evidence of an essential element. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent.pdf
Appeals Panel
09/22/2010
State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent C.A. No. T10-0056 Preliminary Breath Test
Preliminary Breath Test
Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test). Defendant argued that after she refused the preliminary breath test it was a violation of her rights for the officer to request that she take a second test in the barracks. The Cour disagreed and held that the “none shall be given” language in § 31-27.2.1 is clearly in contemplation of a refusal of an actual breath test and that there is nothing in the statute to indicate that the legislature contemplated it applied to a preliminary breath test. See Almeida v. United States Rubber Co., 107 A.2d 330, 332 (R. I. 1954). “[I]t is clear that[,] the only test pondered by the legislature in drafting § 31-27.2.1 is the ‘official’ breath test conducted at a police station[;] if the legislature deems it appropriate for police to administer a test at the station after one has been administered at the scene, it would make little sense to hold that police cannot request for a motorist to submit to that test, simply because he or she refused a PBT.” Accordingly, the violation was sustained.
State of Rhode Island v. Patricia Sargent.pdf