Appeals Panel
08/08/2013
Town of Bristol v. Rebecca Ramos, C.A. No. M12-0019 (August 8, 2013) Burden of Proof
Burden of Proof
Defendant appealed from a decision by the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-4 “vehicle entering stop or yield intersection.” The Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because the judge applied the wrong burden of proof in reaching his decision. Specifically, the trial judge cited the standard he used as “the preponderance of what’s in front of me…” The Panel explained that the proper standard of proof under Rule 17 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure is a standard of “clear and convincing evidence.” The Panel held that the trial judge applied the incorrect standard of proof and that the testimony could not sustain by “clear and convincing” evidence that the Defendant operated her vehicle in violation of the statute charged. The Panel further noted that the judge did not make any specific findings of fact in his decision. Accordingly, the Panel held the trial judge’s decision constituted an error of law requiring reversal and dismissed the charged violation.
Town of Bristol v. Rebecca Ramos, C.A. No. M12-0019 (August 8, 2013).pdf
Appeals Panel
08/08/2013
Town of Bristol v. Rebecca Ramos, C.A. No. M12-0019 (August 8, 2013) Unauthorized Practice of Law
Unauthorized Practice of Law
Defendant appealed from a decision by the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-4 “vehicle entering stop or yield intersection.” At the close of Defendant’s testimony the trial judge “asked the Officer if he had any questions for the Appellant.” The Officer proceeded to present a series of questions to the Appellant regarding the incident. Although Defendant did not raise this issue on appeal, the Panel noted in a footnote its “great concern for the manner in which the testimony in this case was received.” The Panel pointed out, without reaching the issue, that the officer’s questioning of the witness “comes dangerously close” to violating the provisions of R.I.G.L. § 11-27-2, which defines the practice of law. The Panel stated that “such action should be cautiously avoided by persons who have not been admitted to the Bar.”
Town of Bristol v. Rebecca Ramos, C.A. No. M12-0019 (August 8, 2013).pdf
Appeals Panel
08/08/2013
Town of Bristol v. Rebecca Ramos, C.A. No. M12-0019 (August 8, 2013) Hearsay
Hearsay
Defendant appealed from a decision by the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-4 “vehicle entering stop or yield intersection.” The Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because the judge allowed into evidence hearsay in violation of Rule 15 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure. Specifically, the Officer testified that the Defendant failed to stop at the stop sign, but this testimony was based on a conversation with an independent eyewitness not present at trial. The Panel explained that the statement was offered for the truth of the matter asserted and did not fit within one of the recognized exceptions the hearsay rule, and was thus inadmissible. Accordingly, the Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was affected by error of law and reversed and dismissed the charged violation.
Town of Bristol v. Rebecca Ramos, C.A. No. M12-0019 (August 8, 2013).pdf