Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1 (refusal to submit to a chemical test).  Defendant argued that the Trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle because the Trooper relied on an informant’s tip and did not personally observe any erratic driving, traffic violations, or other evidence of a crime.  The Trooper testified he stopped the Defendant because an informant reported a vehicle matching the Defendant’s vehicle had been involved in a hit-and-run accident, and that the driver might have been operating under the influence.  The Panel explained that in determining whether reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop exists based on an informant’s tip, the “totality of the circumstances” is taken into account, and that such a stop is permitted if supported by sufficient detail and corroboration.  Here, the Panel noted that the Trooper relied on an informant who made an official statement, that the tip provided details including the make, model, and registration of the vehicle, that the informant had personally observed the Defendant leave the scene of an accident, that the informant had been following the Defendant while on the phone with the State Police dispatcher, and that the Trooper corroborated those details upon locating the vehicle.  Based on the reliability of the informant and the Trooper’s corroboration of the details of the informant’s tip, the Panel held that the trial judge properly determined that, under the totality of the circumstances, the Trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.