Defendant appealed from a decision by the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-4 “vehicle entering stop or yield intersection.”  The Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because the judge applied the wrong burden of proof in reaching his decision.  Specifically, the trial judge cited the standard he used as “the preponderance of what’s in front of me…”  The Panel explained that the proper standard of proof under Rule 17 of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure is a standard of “clear and convincing evidence.”  The Panel held that the trial judge applied the incorrect standard of proof and that the testimony could not sustain by “clear and convincing” evidence that the Defendant operated her vehicle in violation of the statute charged.  The Panel further noted that the judge did not make any specific findings of fact in his decision.  Accordingly, the Panel held the trial judge’s decision constituted an error of law requiring reversal and dismissed the charged violation.