Credibility

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). At trial, a police officer testified that the Defendant admitted to speeding. Moreover, the officer satisfied the Sprague requirements by testifying to: (1) the radar unit’s operational efficiency; and (2) his own training and experience in the use of a radar unit. See State v. Sprague, 113 R.I. 351, 355-57 (1974). The trial judge found the officer’s testimony to be credible.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was clearly erroneous. But the Appeals Panel “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility.” Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Janes, 586 A.2d 536, 537 (R.I. 1991)). As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Christopher Hook, No. T18-0021 (February 25, 2019).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining a charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-3-1 (operation of unregistered vehicle) and § 31-38-3 (violation of inspection laws). Defendant was pulled over and cited for operating a vehicle that was not registered. At trial, the citing officer testified that upon checking Defendant’s registration, he discovered that the registration belonged to a different vehicle. Moreover, Defendant testified “numerous times” that his vehicle was not registered or inspected at the time of the stop.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was clearly erroneous. Pursuant to §§ 31-3-1 and 31-38-3, “any vehicle operated on public roads must be registered . . . and pass a motor vehicle inspection.” The trial judge found the officer’s testimony to be credible and, therefore, the trial judge concluded that Defendant’s vehicle was not registered or inspected. As the Appeals Panel “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility,” the Panel deferred to the trial judge’s credibility findings. Thus, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Irwin Jacobowitz, No. T18-0017 (February 25, 2019).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed a trial magistrate’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). At trial, the trial magistrate found as credible a police officer’s testimony establishing that the speed limit where the violation occurred was thirty miles per hour. Moreover, the trial magistrate concluded that “by [Defendant’s] own admission[,] he was driving in violation of the speed limit. He said he was doing 35 mph and no more than 35 mph . . . [and] by his own admission he’s in violation of the statute.”

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision was clearly erroneous because there was insufficient evidence offered at trial for the trial magistrate to conclude that the speed limit was thirty miles per hour. But the appeals Panel “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the [trial magistrate] concerning . . . questions of fact.” See Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Janes, 586 A.2d 536, 537 (R.I. 1991)). As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial magistrate’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. William Fallon, No. T18-0012 (January 23, 2019).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to traffic devices). A police officer reported to the scene of a motor vehicle accident at a four-way intersection with four stop signs. At trial, the police officer testified that he asked Defendant whether he had stopped, and that Defendant responded by saying he was not sure and that he thought he had stopped. Also, the other driver involved in the accident testified that she asked Defendant why he did not stop, and that Defendant said that he did not see the stop sign. The trial judge found all of this testimony credible and, therefore, found Defendant guilty of the charged violation.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge erred in crediting the testimony of the police officer and the other driver. But it is well-established that credibility determinations are reserved for trial judges. See generally DeSimone Electric, Inc. v. CMG, Inc., et al., A.2d 613, 621 (R.I. 2006). As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous because the Panel “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of evidence on questions of fact.” Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Janes, 586 A.2d 536, 537 (R.I. 1991)). Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Chiyu Mui M19-0003 (May 6, 2019).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to traffic devices). A police officer observed a vehicle proceed through a red light. At trial, while offering an explanation in mitigation, Defendant admitted to proceeding through a red light.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was erroneous because Defendant offered conflicting testimony regarding the location of the violation at trial. But it is well-established that the Appeals Panel “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgement for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” See Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. V. Janes, 586 A.2d 536, 537 (R.I. 1991)). Moreover, Defendant and the police officer testified that Defendant proceeded through the red light. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was supported by legally competent evidence. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Jillian Snyder, M19-0008 (June 26, 2019).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). A Pawtucket police officer observed Defendant traveling in excess of the posted speed limit. At trial, Defendant suggested that the police officer’s radar unit may have gotten a reading from another driver’s car. In response to Defendant’s suggestion, the police officer testified as to how the radar unit operates, and the officer assured the court that the radar unit reading came from Defendant’s vehicle.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was clearly erroneous because there was no evidence in the record demonstrating that the radar unit’s reading came from Defendant’s vehicle. But the trial judge’s decision was supported by sufficient evidence because the officer’s credible testimony established that the radar unit’s reading came from Defendant’s vehicle. As the Appeals Panel will not disturb a trial judge’s credibility determination, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous. See Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Janes, 586 A.2d 536, 537 (R.I. 1991)). Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Nildo-Elesio Andrade, No. M19-0005 (August 13, 2019).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed a decision by the Middletown Municipal Court sustaining a violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 31-14-2 (speeding). Defendant argued that the Trial Judge should have credited his testimony over that of the citing officer in regards to the actual speed limit in the area that Defendant was stopped. The Appeals Panel, however, noted that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility, and could not disturb the Trial Judge’s findings of credibility. Accordingly, because the Trial Judge found the citing officer’s testimony to be credible and a sufficient basis for sustaining the charged violation, the Appeals Panel denied Defendant’s appeal and sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Albert Steinhauer, No. M17-0009 (April 11, 2018).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed decision of the trial judge sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices). Defendant argued that the trial judge erred by rejecting Defendant’s assertion that she did not have enough time to react after noticing a “Do Not Enter” sign before a police officer signaled Defendant to pull over. The Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous because the Appeals Panel “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Janes, 586 A.2d 536, 537 (R.I. 1991)). Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial judge.

City of East Providence v. Alyssa Stephenson, No. M17-0020 (June 20, 2018).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed decision of the trial judge denying a motion to vacate a default judgment. Defendant argued that the trial judge erred by rejecting Defendant’s assertion that a court clerk refused to accept proof of his community service completion, which would have resulted in the dismissal of the charge. The Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous because the Appeals Panel “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Janes, 586 A.2d 536, 537 (R.I. 1991)). Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial judge.

City of Providence v. Emanuel Joia, M17-0018 (June 11, 2018).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed a decision of the trial judge sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadway violation). Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision to credit a witness’s testimony was clearly erroneous because that witness’s testimony was inconsistent with the statement he gave to the police. The Appeals Panel noted that “inconsistencies in a witness’s statement do not preclude a fact finder from accepting the testimony as credible.” As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous because the Panel “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility.” Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Janes, 586 A.2d 536, 537 (R.I. 1991)). Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial judge.

State of Rhode Island v. Debra Dyer, No. T18-0013 (December 13, 2018).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed a decision of the trial judge sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-18-8 (due care by drivers). Defendant’s vehicle struck a fifteen-year-old girl while she was in a crosswalk. Defendant argued that the trial judge erred in sustaining the violation because the citation contained an error, listing the road conditions as dry when, in fact, they were wet and icy. Whether the citation’s description of the road conditions was an error was a question of fact, and the Appeals Panel properly deferred to the credibility findings of the trial judge. As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Additionally, Defendant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the “sudden emergency doctrine” because Defendant could not have reasonably foreseen the girl crossing the street. The sudden emergency doctrine is only applicable “when one is confronted with an unforeseeable emergency not caused by his or her own negligence.” Malinowski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 727 A.2d 194, 197 (R.I. 1999). The Appeals Panel held that the sudden emergency doctrine was not applicable in the instant case because “it is reasonably foreseeable that pedestrians will cross the street in a crosswalk.” Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the decision of the trial judge.

State of Rhode Island v. Hakeem Pelumi, No. T18-0006 (October 15, 2018).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed a decision by a Trial Judge of the Bristol Municipal Court sustaining a charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (Obedience to Devices). Defendant was cited after a police officer  witnessed Defendant proceed through an intersection while the traffic signal was red. The Trial Judge heard testimony by the citing officer and the Defendant, and then concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence to sustain the charge, finding the officer’s testimony credible. Defendant argued that the officer fabricated his testimony because the officer believed Defendant to be harboring her boyfriend, who was a fugitive. The Appeals Panel, however, noted that it “lack[ed] the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” The Appeals Panel further noted that Defendant had not contested or cross-examined the officer on any of his testimony. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel found that there was clear and convincing evidence to sustain the charged violation, affirmed the Trial Judge’s decision, and denied Defendant’s appeal.

State of Rhode Island v. Megan Zeitler, No. M17-0013 (April 24, 2018).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed a decision by a Trial Judge of the Woonsocket Municipal Court sustaining a charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-5 (entering from private road or driveway). Defendant’s vehicle collided with another vehicle on a public road after Defendant had exited a private driveway. Defendant argued that the road was clear when he exited the private driveway (thus following the requirements in the statute). The Appeals Panel noted that there were two competing versions of events and that the Panel lacked the ability to substitute its opinion on witness credibility for that of the Trial Judge. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel found that the Trial Judge’s decision was supported by legally competent evidence and was not clearly erroneous. The Appeals Panel thus affirmed the Trial Judge’s decision and denied Defendant’s appeal.

State of Rhode Island v. Francis Spicola, No. M17-0017 (May 7, 2018).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed a trial judge’s decision sustaining a violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-22-31 (mobile telephone usage by motor vehicle operators). At trial, the citing officer testified that “there [was] no doubt in [his] mind that there was a cell phone in [Defendant’s] hand.” Conversely, Defendant testified that she was not using her phone while driving, and she supported her testimony with a call log from her wireless cell phone provider. Although the trial judge admitted the call log into evidence, he stated that call logs typically have “very, very, very limited relevancy” because the judge could not be sure that the call log matched the phone that Defendant had on the day of the citation. Additionally, the trial judge found the police officer’s testimony credible.

On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred by: (1) crediting the officer’s testimony over her own; and (2) by failing to afford the proper weight to the call logs. Both issues involved credibility determinations, and the Appeals Panel “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge.” Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348. (R.I. 1993) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Janes, 586 A.2d 536, 537 (R.I. 1991)). As such, the Appeals Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Appeals Panel affirmed the trial judge’s decision.

State of Rhode Island v. Merimee Christopherson, No. T18-0016 (December 11, 2018).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (“obedience to stop signs”). The Court noted that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  Therefore, the Appeals Panel held that its role was doubly limited and could not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge.  Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.

State of Rhode Island v. DeQuell Golson, No. M16-0009 (June 5, 2017).pdf

Credibility

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-22-2 (restriction on backing—improper backing) and §31-15-12 (interval between vehicles—following too close).  The Defendant argued the trial judge’s decision was not supported by the evidence and specifically that the §31-15-12 violation never occurred.  The Panel noted that it “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”  Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993) (citations omitted).  Furthermore, the Panel noted the appeal focused only on a factual dispute and that the Appellant was not prejudiced in any way.  The Panel must give deference to the trial judge and the factual conclusions the judge reached.  Therefore, the Panel affirmed the violations.

“State of Rhode Island v. David Jacobs, C.A. No. T14-0010 (February 3, 2016)”.pdf

Credibility

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-17-2 (vehicle turning left or right).  The Defendant argued the trial magistrate’s decision was not supported by the evidence and that the trial magistrate relied on hearsay. Specifically, the Defendant failed to yield the right-of-way as required by the statute. The Panel noted that it “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”  Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993) (citations omitted).  Furthermore, the Panel found no evidence to support the allegation that the magistrate relied on hearsay.  Ultimately, the Panel found the trial magistrate did not abuse his discretion and his decision was backed by “legally competent evidence.”

City of Cranston v. Carlos Molina Martinez, C.A. No. T15-0020 (January 28, 2016).pdf

Credibility

The Defendant appealed the Pawtucket Municipal Court’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-28-7(f) (motor vehicle plates for persons with disabilities).  The police officer who issued the ticket testified that the Defendant’s car was parked in a marked handicapped parking space, while the Defendant testified that her car was not operable when the violation occurred and could not have been parked in that space.  The trial judge decided after hearing and reviewing all the evidence that the Officer was credible and the Appellant’s car was in fact parked in a handicapped parking space.  The Panel noted that it “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”  Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993) (citations omitted).  The Panel found that the trial judge’s decision was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and that there was no error of law.  The appeal was denied.

City of Pawtucket v. Mary E. Woll II, C.A. No. M14-0027 (January 22, 2016).pdf

Credibility

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 §31-18-3 (“right-of-way in crosswalk”). The Defendant argued the trial judge’s decision was not supported by the evidence and specifically that the §31-18-3 violation never occurred.  The Panel noted that it “lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”  Link v. State, 633 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1993) (citations omitted).  The Panel must give deference to the trial judge and the factual conclusions the judge reached.  Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was affirmed.

City of Woonsocket v. Yi Lin, No. M14-0013 (September 27, 2016).pdf

Credibility

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-51-2.2 (stopping for school bus required). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision was erroneous because the trial magistrate credited the Officer’s testimony over his own. Here, the trial magistrate determined that the Officer’s testimony was credible and sufficient to sustain the changed violation. The Panel held that the trial magistrate did not abuse his discretion because his decision to sustain the charged violation was supported by sufficient evidence. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the violation.

City of Providence v. Andrew Krichak, C.A. No. T14-0037 (April 29, 2015).pdf

Credibility

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits) and § 31-27-24 (multiple moving offenses). The Defendant argued the trial magistrate erred in crediting the Sergeant’s testimony over his own. Here, the trial magistrate determined that the Sergeant’s testimony was credible and sufficient to sustain the charged violation. The Panel held that since the trial magistrate was satisfied by clear and convincing evidence, the trial magistrate’s decision was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the violation.

Town of Portsmouth v. Kevin Dietz, C.A. No. T14-0043 (April 29, 2015).pdf

Credibility

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (speed over 11 miles per house) and § 31-15-11 (laned roadway violations). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred in believing the Officer’s testimony over his own. The Panel held that since the trial magistrate determined that the Officer’s testimony was credible and sufficient to sustain the changed violation, the trial magistrate did not err in sustaining the violation. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the violation.

Town of Middletown v. Marvette Neal, C.A. No. T14-0032 (April 29, 2015).pdf

Credibility

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-28-7 (handicap parking violation and wrongful use). Here, the Officer cited the Defendant for using another person’s expired handicap placard and the Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred in believing the Officer’s testimony. The Panel held that the trial magistrate did not err because he found the Officer’s testimony credible and sufficient after listening to the testimony of both witnesses. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the violation.

City of Providence v. Carolyn Gamble-Rivers, C.A. No. T14-0025 (April 3, 2015).pdf

Credibility

The Defendant appealed from the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs). The Defendant argued that the trial judge erred in crediting the Officer’s testimony over her own. The Panel held that because the trial judge determined that the Officer’s testimony was both credible and sufficient to sustain the charged violation, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

Town of North Providence v. Julia DaLomba, C.A. No. M14-0010 (March 20, 2015).pdf

Credibility

The Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-3 (“move over” law). The Defendant argued that the trial judge erred in relying on the Trooper’s testimony to sustain the violation. Here, the Officer testified that the Defendant, despite the absence of other vehicles on the road, did not move over in compliance with the statute and drove at a rate of speed that made the Trooper’s vehicle shake. The Panel held that the trial judge did not err because he was within his discretion when he relied upon the Officer’s testimony. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial judge’s decision to sustain the violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Bruce G. Argo, C.A. T14-0023 (February 13, 2015).pdf

Credibility

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision was arbitrary because it relied solely on the Corporal’s testimony. The Panel held that because the trial magistrate found the Corporal’s testimony to be both credible and sufficient, the trial magistrate did not err in sustaining the charged violation. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the violation.

Town of Richmond v. Karen B. Nelligan, C.A. No. T14-0054 (February 17, 2015).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Defendant claimed that the trial judge abused his discretion because he credited the testimony of the officer over his own testimony. However, the Appeals Panel held that only the finder of fact may asses the credibility of witnesses. Accordingly, Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion and sustained the violation against the defendant. State of Rhode Island v. Abraham Cure, Jr., C.A. No. T13-0049 (January 21, 2014).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22 (safety belt use). Defendant claimed that he was wearing his seat belt and that the trial judge erred because he credited the testimony of the officer over his own. However, the Appeals Panel held that only the finder of fact may asses the credibility of witnesses. Here, the trial judge chose to believe the officer’s testimony that he had an unobstructed view, the defendant was not wearing a seat belt and that the defendant was the person operating the vehicle. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant. City of East Providence v. James Folan, C.A. No. M13-0016 (January 28, 2014).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-5 (overtaking on the right).  Defendant claimed that the trial judge erred in crediting the testimony of the officer and other driver over her own.  The Court held that it lacked the authority to determine the credibility of witnesses.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation.

City of Providence v. Aysia Rivers, C.A. No. T13-0042 (January 28, 2014).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (Laned Roadway Violation).  At trial, the charging officer testified that he observed the defendant abruptly swerve out of the lane of travel and into the oncoming lane, without using a turn signal, on a two lane road separated by double yellow lines.  Defendant denied leaving her lane of travel, testifying that she turned her wheel slightly to avoid hitting a “kitty” that had run in front of her vehicle.  The trial judge chose to credit the officer’s testimony over the defendant’s and found that it provided clear and convincing evidence that the defendant failed to drive her vehicle “as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane” and did not first ascertain that her movement could be made with safety as required by the statute.  The Panel explained that it will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge on issues of credibility.  Accordingly, the Panel affirmed the conviction.

Town of North Kingstown vs. Dee Scanlon, C.A. No. M14-0006 (July 1, 2014).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2(a), “Prima facie limits.”  At trial, the issuing officer testified that he observed the registration number on Defendant’s vehicle when taking radar of the defendant’s vehicle exceeding the posted speed limit.  The officer then testified that he lost sight of Defendant’s vehicle before making the stop.  On appeal, Defendant claimed that the officer misidentified his vehicle with another vehicle that was exceeding the speed limit and that the trial judge’s decision to favor the officer’s testimony over defendant’s was an abuse of discretion.  The Appeals Panel explained that it will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge on issues of credibility.  The Panel explained that the trial judge was satisfied with the officer’s testimony that he observed the defendant’s registration number and that he measured the defendant’s vehicle exceeding the speed limit.  Accordingly, the Panel held the sustained charge was 

Town of Middletown v. Kyle DeCosta, C.A. No. M13-0020 (February 25, 2014).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the trial judge’s decision to sustain the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-22-30, “Text Messaging While Operating a Motor Vehicle.”  Defendant claimed that the trial judge’s decision was an abuse of discretion because the judge favored the testimony of the charging Trooper over the testimony of defendant.  At trial, the Trooper testified that on Route 95 at 12:15 a.m. he pulled alongside the driver’s side of defendant’s vehicle and observed defendant holding his cell phone at eye-level while manipulating the text message screen, which was illuminated in plain view.  The Trooper further testified that defendant, while holding the cell phone, abruptly swerved in and out of the lane of travel.  The defendant testified that the Trooper mistook his Mini Cooper’s interior “mood lighting” as illumination from a cell phone.  The Panel explained that it will not substitute its judgment of witness credibility for that of the trial judge.  The Panel noted that the trial judge was satisfied by the Trooper’s testimony that he observed the defendant at close range handling a cell phone and manipulating its screen at eye-level.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Jason Kilsey, C.A. No. T13-0056 (March 3, 2014).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed from the trial magistrate’s decision sustaining two separate charged violations of G.L. 1956 § 31-51-2.2 “Stopping for school bus required.”  Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision to deny her motions to vacate the default judgments against her was an abuse of discretion.  Specifically, the Defendant argued that the trial magistrate should have given credit to her explanation that she missed her initial arraignments because she did not receive either citation in the mail.  The Panel pointed to the wide discretion a trial magistrate enjoys in determining whether to vacate a default judgment.  The Panel noted that the trial magistrate did not find the Defendant credible, that the Defendant testified that she lived at the address to which the citations were mailed, and that the Defendant’s signature appeared on the tickets issued at the scene, which included her arraignment dates.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.

City of Providence v. Samanda Martinez-Tavarez,C.A. No. T13-0059 (March 6, 2014).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed from the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4, “Obedience to devices.”  The Defendant argued that trial judge’s decision to credit the police officer’s testimony of his own was an abuse of discretion.  Specifically, Defendant testified that the light was yellow when he went through the intersection and that he slowed his vehicle down to avoid a collision with the officer’s vehicle.  The Officer testified that the Defendant made no attempt to slow his vehicle and that the light was red when the Defendant passed through the intersection. The Panel gave deference to the trial judge’s discretion to adopt the Officer’s testimony over the Defendant’s and sustained the charged violation.

Town of Barrington v. Marcus Monroe, C.A. No. T13-0053 (February 21, 2014).pdf

Credibility

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2, “Prima Facie Limits.”  The trooper testified that his radar equipment, which had been calibrated both before and after his shift,  indicated that the Defendant’s vehicle had been traveling at 38 mph in a 25 mph zone.   Defendant argued the decision should be reversed because the Officer lacked credibility and lied under oath.  Specifically, Defendant argued that because the Officer wrote two tickets, each containing a different speed, the Officer must not have known how fast Defendant had been traveling.  Although the trooper had apparently concluded his testimony, the trial judge then asked the Officer if he had issued the first ticket in an attempt to be lenient with the Defendant, then written a second ticket for the full amount of the violation after Defendant had become uncooperative.  The Officer answered in the affirmative.  The Panel pointed out that the trial judge found the Officer’s testimony to be credible and that in situations where a motorist is uncooperative, it is not unusual for an officer to use discretion in writing a ticket.  The Panel explained it will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge on issues of witness credibility.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Town of West Warwick v. Neil Medeiros, C.A. No. T13-0046 (February 20, 2014).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed from the trial judge’s decision sustaining the charged violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4, “Obedience to devices.”  The Defendant argued that trial judge’s decision was against the evidence presented.  Specifically, Defendant testified that the light was yellow when he went through the intersection and that he proceeded through the intersection to avoid being rear-ended by a vehicle directly behind him.  The Officer testified that the light was red when Defendant drove through the intersection. The Panel gave deference to the trial judge’s discretion to adopt the Officer’s testimony over the Defendant’s and sustained the charged violation.

City of East Providence vs. Clifford Hoy, C.A. No. M12-0015 (April 4, 2013).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the East Providence Municipal Court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-22-22 (g) (safety belt use). The defendant argued that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in crediting the officer’s testimony over hers. The Appeals Panel held that crediting the testimony of the officer over the defendant’s was within the judge’s discretion because only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial magistrate.

City of East Providence v. Joanne Quinn C.A. No. M13-0007.pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-8-3 (improper use of evidence of registration or certificate of title).  The Court held that the trial judge’s decision to rely on the officer’s testimony was not affected by error of law.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation. 

City of Cranston v. Karl Anastasi, C.A. No. T12-0046 (January 18, 2013).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-3 (intersection with through highway-failure to yield).  The Court held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation.

City of Pawtucket v. Donovan Marler, C.A. No. M12-0016 (January 4, 2013).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop sign).  The Court held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation. 

City of Pawtucket v. Erica Lukas, C.A. No. M12-0017 (January 4, 2013).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The Coutr held that the Appeals Panel lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  Accordingly, the violation was sustained. 

State of Rhode Island v. Manuel Vieira, C.A. No. T12-0033 (February 12, 2013).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits), The Court held that the Appeals Panel lacks the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  Accordingly, the violation was sustained. 

State of Rhode Island v. Robert Frank, C.A. No. T12-0074 (April 2, 2013).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop sign).  The Court held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation. 

Town of Bristol v. Melissa Malik, C.A. No. T12-0064 (January 31, 2013).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The Court held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation. 

Town of Lincoln v. Salim Ayas, C.A. No. T12-042 (January 22, 2013).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-12-12 (power of local authorities) including Rules and Regulations for Ground Transportation at T.F. Green State Airport § 2-2-2 (no solicitation). Defendant claimed that the trial judge’s decision was clearly erroneous in crediting the testimony of the citing officer that he observed the defendant soliciting passengers over his testimony that he had been dispatched to pick up a passenger. However, the Appeals Panel held that only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge.State of Rhode Island (Airport Police Department) v. Jose A. Rodriguez, No. T13-0047 (September 24, 2013).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Defendant claimed that the decision should be set aside because the judge erred in crediting the testimony of the citing officer. Specifically, the Defendant argued that because the Officer wrote the wrong date on the citation, his testimony should be discredited.  The Panel explained it will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues of credibility.  Here, the factual finding by the trial judge that the defendant was speeding was not clearly erroneous because it was fully supported by the record where the officer testified to the defendant’s speed, the recent calibration of the radar device, and his training in the use of radar devices.  The Panel explained that an error or omission will not be grounds for reversal unless the error misleads the defendant to his or her prejudice.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the violation against the defendant.

City of Woonsocket v. R. Michelle Pierre, C.A. No. T12-0075 (May 9, 2013).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charge violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (Prima Facie Limits).  Specifically, Defendant argued that she was not speeding and that the citing Officer was not the officer that clocked her speed.  Rather, an officer on the other side of the road clocked her speed and then called in the Officer who issued the citation and appeared at trial.  The Panel explained that the trial judge properly decided to credit the Officer’s testimony over the Defendant’s testimony because the officer testified to his observation of the Defendant, the actual speed Defendant was driving, to the calibration of the radar unit, and to his training in radar devices.  The Panel held that the trial judge’s decision was supported by substantial evidence on the whole record.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Town of Scituate v. Tayla DelVecchio, C.A. No. T12-0089 (May 22, 2013).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (Obedience to Stop Signs).  The Appeals Panel held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  Therefore, as the trial court found the officer to be credible and because the officer was at the intersection for the sole purpose to witness traffic violations, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation against the defendant.

City of Pawtucket v. Russell Blanco, C.A. No. M12-0002 (May 15, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs). The Appeals Panel held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge.

Town of Smithfield v. Stephen Macchioni, C.A. No. T12-0016 (May 8, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The Appeals Panel held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge, unless the decision was clearly erroneous.  As the decision of the trial judge was not clearly erroneous, the Court sustained the violation. 

Town of Glocester v. John J. Quinn, C.A. No. T11-0077 (March 7, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices). The defendant argued that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in finding that the defendant went through a red light causing an accident. The Panel explained that the trier of fact assesses the credibility of witnesses and that although all of the parties involved in the accident claimed they had a green light, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he chose to credit the testimony of the other two witnesses instead of the testimony of Defendant.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

City of Woonsocket v. Deborah J. Freeman, C.A. No. M11-0027 (August 12, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices). The defendant argued that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in finding that the defendant went through a red light causing an accident.  The Panel explained that the trier of fact is entitled to determine the credibility of witnesses.  Here, the trial judge found that Defendant’s testimony “didn’t make sense” and was “completely inconsistent” with both the testimony of an impartial witness and the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident.  The Panel held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in crediting the testimony of the other witnesses over the Defendant’s testimony.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Town of Johnston v. Amalia Blinkhorn, C.A. No. M11-0029 (May 3, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  Defendant claimed the trial judge committed an abuse of discretion in crediting the Officer’s testimony over his own.  Additionally, Defendant argued that the charge should be dismissed because there was no signage indicating the speed limit.  The Panel noted that at trial the judge found it significant that the Defendant testified that he admitted to speeding and determined that a motorist is presumed to know the speed limit, despite a lack of signage.  The Panel held that the trial judge properly credited the Officer’s testimony, which included that the Officer had been properly trained in the use of radar, and that the radar unit had been calibrated on the day the citation was issued.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

Town of North Kingstown v. Maurice Stefano, C.A. No. M12-0010 (August 16, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-09 (obedience to stop sign). Defendant claimed that he came to a complete stop at the stop sign and white stop line, and that the trial magistrate’s ruling was clearly erroneous because he credited the testimony of the officer over his own.  The Panel noted that the trial magistrate chose to believe the officer’s testimony that he had an unobstructed and clear view of defendant when he slowed down but did not come to a complete stop.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the violation.

Town of Middletown v. Gary Lewis, C.A. No. T11-0086 (May 3, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-26-5 (duty in accident resulting in damage to highway fixtures).  Defendant argued that the trial judge’s decision was clearly erroneous because he credited the testimony of the Officer and a witness over her own testimony.  Specifically, Defendant testified that she did not drive on the day of the alleged accident, and that photographs she introduced at trial showed no damage to her vehicle.  However, the Officer testified that the photographs did in fact show damage to Defendant’s vehicle, and testified that he traced skid marks from her vehicle back to the damaged curb.  The witness testified that he observed Defendant’s vehicle strike the curb, causing damage to the curb, and drive away.  The Panel held that the trial judge properly considered all of the evidence, and properly chose to adopt the testimony of the Officer and the witness.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

City of Warwick v. Rhonda Krikorian, C.A. No. T12-0009 (May 7, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs).  The Appeals Panel held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  The panel went on to reason that it would be impermissible to second guess the trial judge’s impressions as he observed the officer, listened to his testimony, and determined what to accept and what to disregards, what to believe and disbelieve.  Thus, the Appeals Panel was satisfied that the trial judge had not abused his discretion, and the decision to sustain the violation was supported by legally competent evidence.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation. 

City of Pawtucket v. Matthew Saba, C.A. No. M11-0026 (March 4, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The defendant argued that he was not speeding and that the trial judge abused his discretion in crediting the testimony of the Trooper.  At trial, the Trooper testified that he recorded the Defendant exceeding the speed limit, testified to his training in the use of radar, and testified that the radar unit had been calibrated before and after his shift on the day of the violation.   Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Alexander Brown, C.A. No. T12-0037 (August 16, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed from the decision of the hearing magistrate accepting his guilty plea to the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-22-22 (safety belt use—child restraint) and imposing a sentence that included a six month license suspension.  Specifically, the Defendant argued that the sentence was unduly harsh and therefore constituted an abuse of discretion.  The Panel explained that a plain reading of § 31-41.1-6 authorizes members of the Court to suspend a motorist’s license for any violation of Title 31 of the General Laws of Rhode Island.  The Panel then reasoned that the General Assembly gave broad discretion to a judge or magistrate to impose sanctions under § 31-41.1-6 and held that the magistrate did not abuse his discretion because he was statutorily authorized to impose a sentence including license suspension.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the sentence.

State of Rhode Island v. Zigmond Coffey, C.A. No. T12-0014 (May 4, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-3 (Conditions Requiring Reduced Speed).  The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred in adopting the Trooper’s testimony over her own.  The Trooper testified that the Defendant drove her vehicle between his vehicle and another Trooper’s vehicle as they were positioned on the highway with their lights flashing to slow traffic in an attempt to escort a disabled vehicle to the breakdown lane.  The Defendant argued that the Trooper was confusing this violation with a separate and unrelated violation.  Specifically, the Defendant testified that there was no disabled vehicle, that she observed the Troopers slowing traffic, and that she swerved to avoid a collision with the Trooper as he was retrieving a piece of cardboard from the road.  (The Trooper testified that it was the cardboard that caused the flat tire on the disabled vehicle).  The Panel explained that it will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on issues of witness credibility.  The Panel noted that the trial magistrate determined the Trooper to be a credible and reliable witness and properly relied on his testimony.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Donna Nightingale, C.A. No. T12-0005 (March 23, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to traffic control devices).  The Court held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation. 

Town of Barrington v. David Tien, C.A. No. T12-0053 (December 18, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-4 (overtaking on left). The Court held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Therefore, the Appeals Panel sustained the violation.

Town of North Providence v. Tavares, C.A. No. M12-0005 (July 31, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways). The Appeals Panel held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation.

Town of North Providence v. James Oliveira, C.A. No. M12-0004 (July 31, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1965 § 31-15-12 (interval between vehicles).  The Appeals Panel held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation.

City of Cranston v. Jerry Dorsey, C.A. No. T12-0029 (June 26, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the charged violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 §§ 31-15-11 (laned roadways) and 31-15-5 (turn signal required).  At trial, the Officer testified that he observed Defendant traveling at a high rate of speed, over laned lines, passing vehicles on the left and right, without signaling.  The Defendant argued that the trial judge erred in finding him guilty of the violations.  The Panel explained it will not substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge on issues of credibility.  The Panel noted that the trial judge found the Officer’s testimony credible, and specifically noted the Defendant admitted to having a broken signal bulb.  On the basis of this evidence, the Panel held that the trial judge did not err in finding the Defendant guilty.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations. 

City of East Providence v. James Roberson, C.A. No. M12-0009 (December 13, 2012).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The defendant claimed that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in crediting the Trooper’s testimony over his own.  Specifically, the Defendant argued that he exceeded the speed limit to avoid another motorist who twice hit the rear of Defendant’s car, placing the Defendant in fear for his life.  The Trooper testified that he had not heard the Defendant’s story at the scene, but acknowledged that he was accompanied by another Trooper.  The Defendant testified that he told his story about being in danger to the other Trooper.  The Panel noted that the trial judge inquired as to the merits of the Defendant’s story by questioning the Trooper.  The Panel did not reach the issue of whether the Defendant’s version of events, if true, would constitute a defense, noting that the trial judge “clearly assessed the credibility of the trooper and the Appellant and then sustained the charge.” The Panel noted that the trial judge clearly assessed the credibility of both the Trooper and the Defendant and that the Trooper testified to the calibration of his radar device and to his training in the use of radar.  The Panel held that the trial judge did not err in adopting the Trooper’s testimony.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violation.  

State of Rhode Island v. James Sullivan, C.A. No. T11-0005 (March 30, 2011) Credibility.pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1056 § 31-27-24 (prima facie limits).  The Appeals Panel held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge.  Accordingly, the Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion and sustained the violation.

Town of Portsmouth v. John Coleman, No. T11-0038 (November 10, 2011).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violations of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-11 (laned roadways), R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-23-13 (muffler violation), and R.I.G.L. § 31-16-5 (turn signal required).  The Appeals Panel held that the trial magistrate’s decision was supported by legally competent evidence and was not affected by error of law.  Additionaly, the Appeals Panel held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility.  Accordingly, Court sustained the violations against the defendant. 

State of Rhode Island v. Bruce Slater, C.A. No. T11-0037 (November 4, 2011).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-4 (vehicle entering stop or yield intersection).  The Appealsl Panel held that it was for the trial judge to evaluate issues of credibility and fact.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation.

City of Woonsocket v. Michael Skinner, No. M11-0008 (September 14, 2011).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The Appeals Panel held that it did not have an opportunity to view the live trial testimony of the officer and it would be impermissible to second-guess the trial magistrate’s impressions because it lacked the authority to asses the credibility of witnesses.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Kevin Silva, C.A. No. T11-0042 (August 5, 2011).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-3 (conditions requiring reduced speeds).  The Appeals Panel held that the trail judge, sitting as a finder of fact, is expected to use his or her judgment in evaluating issues of credibility and fact.  Accordingly, the Court held that it lacked the authority to determine the credibility of witnessess and sustained the violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Edwin Loignon, T11-0027 (August 2, 2011).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs).  The Appeals Panel held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility or to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing judge concerning the weight of evidence on questions of fact.  Therefore, the Appeals Panel could not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge and sustained the violation.

Town of Bristol v. Joan McMaster, C.A. No. M11-0004 (June 27, 2011).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The defendant alleged that the traffic stop was only a pretext to stop him.  The Court held that because it did not observed the testimony of the defendant or the officers regarding the reason for the traffic stop, it was limited to review the record presented and must defer to the trier of fact on determinations of credibility pursuant to R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-41.8(f). The Court went on to note that even if police had a dual motive for the stop, that did not make it fatally pretextual. The officer’s testimony reflected all the elements necessary to sustain the charge . Accordingly, because the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record did not show a clear error of law, the Court affirmed trial judge’s decision and sustained the violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Francesco Florio, C.A. T10-0086 ( January 26, 2011).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The defendant alleged that the traffic stop was only a pretext to stop him.  The Court held that because it did not observe the testimony of either the defendant or the officers regarding the reason for the traffic stop it was limited to the record presented and must defer to the trier of facts determinations of credibility pursuant to §31-41.8(f). Additionaly, the Court held that even if the police had a dual motive for the stop that did not make it fatally pretextual. The officer’s testimony reflected all the elements to sustain the violation. Accordingly, the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record did not show a clear error of law and the Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge sustaiing the violation against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Rodney Lambert, C.A. T10-0085 (January 26, 2011).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The defendant argued that because he was travelling so close to other vehicles, the Trooper could not prove that her radar unit was able to distinguish between his vehicle and the others.  At trial, the Trooper testified that she was certain that her radar unit recorded the Defendant’s vehicle because she observed Defendant’s vehicle moving faster than the others and the radar unit picks up the fastest moving vehicle in its scope.  The Trooper then testified to her training in the use of radar, and testified that the radar unit had been calibrated before and after her shift on the day of the violation.  The Panel held that the Trooper’s testimony satisfied the factors for admissibility of radar readings set forth in State v Sprague, 322 A.2d 36 (1974), and that it would not substitute its judgment for that of the trial magistrate when it comes to credibility of witnesses.  Accordingly, the Panel sustained the charged violations.

State of Rhode Island v. Richard Ferreira, C.A. No. T10-0021 (June 16, 2010).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits).  The Court held that the trial magistrate did not abuse his discretion when, after weighting the testimony before him, he decided to believe the officer’s testimony that the defendant had in fact violated the posted limits. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

City of East Providence v. Paulo Silva, C.A. No. T10-0049 (October 13, 2010)..pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-3 (passing of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions). The Court held that it must defer to the trial judge’s evidentiary findings regarding determinations on the credibility of witnesses. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the violation because the officer testified that the defendant was operating a vehicle “attempting to pass somebody, another vehicle in a no passing zone,” and that the defendant was “follow[ing] [the] vehicle more closely than [was] reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and the traffic upon the condition of the highway.”  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation. 

Town of West Greenwich v. John Kornliff C.A. No.T10-0035 (July 12, 2010).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to traffic control devices). The Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he sustained the violation despite the defendant’s testimony that his car was past the stop line when the light changed to yellow. The Appeals Panel held that it lacked the authority to assess witness credibility and defered to the trial judge’s credibility finding. The Appeals Panel held that there were no errors of law and that the decision of the trial judge was not clearly erroneous in light of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on record.  Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Joseph Rahed September 1, 2010.pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices). Defendant asserted that the trial judge committed reversible error in crediting the testimony of the officer over hers. The Court held that questions of credibility rest solely with the fact finder and the trial judge’s decision to credit the officer’s testimony that the defendant’s vehicle clearly passed through the traffic light when it was red was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Louise Marcus, C.A. No. T09-0076 (January 6, 2010).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-16 (use of emergency break-down lane for travel). The defendant claimed that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in crediting the testimony of the citing officer over his testimony.  However, at trial, the defendant admitted to driving his vehicle in the emergency breakdown lane and the Court held that only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charges against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Justin Zebrowski-Blackson, C.A. No. T09-0107 (March 29, 2010).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-12 (interval between vehicles). Defendant argued that the trial magistrate abused his discretion by crediting the testimony of the officer over that of the defendant. The Appeals Panel held that the defendant failed to rebut the officer’s testimony that he was driving at ten to fifteen feet from the officer’s cruiser. The Court also held that only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial magistrate.

State of Rhode Island v. James Adams, C.A. T09-0013 (March 3, 2010).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the Pawtucket Municipal Court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-9 (obedience to stop signs). The defendant argued that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in crediting the officer’s testimony over hers. The Appeals Panel held that crediting the testimony of the officer over the defendant’s was within the judge’s discretion because only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial magistrate.

City of Pawtucket v. Christine Nation C.A. No. M09-0001 (August 17, 2009).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). Defendant argued that the trial magistrate’s decision was an abuse of discretion because he credited the testimony of the Trooper over his own testimony.  Specifically, Defendant argued that two vehicles overtook his own at the time he passed the Trooper and the Trooper’s radar might have recorded those cars and not his own.  However, the Panel held that only the finder of fact may asses the credibility of witnesses. Accordingly, the Panel held that the trial magistrate did not abuse his discretion and sustained the violation against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Alessandro Rescio, C.A. No. T08-0143 (January 21, 2009).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the North Providence Municipal Court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-09 (obedience to stop signs). The defendant claimed that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in crediting the officer’s testimony over his and his wife’s testimony. However, the Court held that only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charges against the defendant.Town of North Providence v. Paul DiNobile, C.A. No. M09-0002 (May 18,2009).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-13-4 (obedience to devices). The trial judge was satisfied that the light was functioning properly despite the defendant’s contrary contention. Since the decision of the trial judge was not clearly erroneous, the court affirmed that decision sustaining the charge against the defendant.City of Providence v. Gerald Desir, C.A. No. T09-0057 (July 15, 2009).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The defendant claimed that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in crediting the testimony of the citing officer over his testimony because the officer appeared to be reading from a paper when testifying and made a mistake as to the color of the defendant’s vehicle.  However, the Court held that only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. George Philips, C.A. No. T09-0036 (August 18, 2009).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The defendant introduced paperwork evidence from his GPS indicating that he was not speeding at the time he was stopped by the citing officer. The citing officer testified that the defendant was speeding according to his radar unit and also testified that the unit had been properly calibrated. The Court held that the trial court’s decision to credit the officer’s testimony over the defendant’s was within its discretion because only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court sustained the violation against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Frantz Louizia, C.A. No. T09-0054 (July 13, 2009).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trail judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-15-7 (places where overtaking prohibited). Defendant introduced photos of the road into evidence to show that he crossed the double yellow line to avoid potholes which would have caused damage to his vehicle. Defendant claims that the trial judge abused his discretion by crediting the testimony of the officer over his. However, the Court held that only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.

State of Rhode Island v. Alaba Sobowale , C.A. No. T09-0037 (September 24, 2009).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial court sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-17-6 (yielding to emergency vehicles). The defendant claimed that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in crediting the officer’s testimony over his.  However, the Court held that only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court sustaining the charge against the defendant.

City of Providence v. Douglas Drexel, C.A. No. T09-0009 (May 18, 2009).pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision the decision of the trial judge sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Appeals Panel held that the trial court’s decision to credit the officer’s testimony over the defendant’s was within its discretion because only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial magistrate.

State of Rhode Island v. Yural Mckie, C.A. No. M09-0041.pdf

Credibility

Defendant appealed the decision of the trial magistrate sustaining the violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-20-12 (stopping for school bus required). Defendant argued that the trial magistrate abused his discretion in crediting the testimony of the officer and the bus driver over the defendant’s testimony. The Appeals Panel held that the decision to credit the officer’s testimony and the bus driver’s testimony over the defendant’s was within his discretion because only the finder of fact may assess the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial magistrate.

Town of Tiverton v. Kathleen Chasse, C.A. No. T09-0048.pdf

Credibility

The Defendant appealed the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation of R.I.G.L. 1956 § 31-14-2 (prima facie limits). The Defendant argued that the trial magistrate erred in crediting the Trooper’s testimony because the Trooper appeared “confused” and “disoriented” as he recalled the Defendant’s traffic stop. The Panel held that it would be impermissible to second-guess the trial magistrate’s decision because it did not have the opportunity to view the Trooper’s live trial testimony. The Panel further held that the trial magistrate’s decision was supported by sufficient evidence. Accordingly, the Panel upheld the trial magistrate’s decision to sustain the charged violation.

State of Rhode Island v. Kwame Darko, C.A. T08-0117 (October 29, 2008).pdf